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7Abstract
The study analyses the relationship between public debt, external and internal
disequilibrium and inflation in Hungary through changes in the public sector borrowing
requirement and in the structure of budget financing. The analysis is based on data
from the 1986-1997 period in order to put the changes in true perspective.
Policy constraints stemming from high indebtedness and their macroeconomic
consequences are analysed by comparing different measures of fiscal deficit, as well as
by quantifying the factors determining the evolution of the public debt/GDP ratio. We
focus on the operational deficit (which is derived from the nominal deficit by
eliminating the inflation compensation component of interest payments) and on its
financing. The study presents a detailed empirical analysis of the evolution of the
financing structure (seigniorage - debt) as well as of the role and structural changes of
debt financing.
The calculations are based on net consolidated public debt, which includes the
combined debt of the budget and the central bank to other sectors net of claims. The
consolidation of budget and central bank balances is unavoidable in order to get
reliable indicators of the fiscal stance since in Hungary the central bank has been
responsible for borrowing abroad in its own name. We introduced the category of
¢extended¢ consolidated public debt (including the stock of central bank’s sterilisation
instruments) which enabled us to analyse the past eleven years in a consistent
framework, and to reveal the trends as well as the dynamic relationships of the debt
accumulation process. The analysis shows that the shift to a new regime of deficit
financing based on issuing marketable government securities (in 1992) did not increase
the fiscal burden, it merely revealed its true magnitude by separating monetary and
fiscal functions and by increasing transparency.
The analysis of consolidated debt revealed that throughout the last ten years the
implicit real interest rates on public debt exceeded the growth rate of the economy,
which led to the continuous increase of the debt ratio (the gross debt/GDP around
90% in the middle of nineties). This effect was mitigated only from 1995 by the fiscal
adjustment resulting a primary surplus in the budget. The seigniorage did not play an
important role in financing after 1992, it amounted to 1-2% of GDP. However, the
major element in the significant (over 15 percentage points) reduction in the debt-to-
GDP ratio over the last three years was the devotion of privatisation revenues to retire
public debt.
Analysing past developments, we came to the conclusion that despite the significant
reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the last few years, the debt burden is still
significant and a further reduction of the debt to GDP ratio is inevitable in order to
create the conditions for sustainable growth and to ensure the continuous convergence
to developed countries. This requires a structural primary surplus of 1.5-2% of GDP in
the medium run, if we take into account the requirement of sustainability, the goal of
further reductions in the inflation rate and the fact that with the end of the privatisation
process privatisation revenues will not provide additional sources for financing.
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Although Hungary played a leading role in the introduction of different reforms among
the ex-socialist countries in the 1980s, the first half of the 1990s was a period of
unsuccessful stabilisation, and by the spring of 1995 the country could not avoid the
introduction of a comprehensive adjustment package2. The unsatisfactory fiscal
adjustments and its belated implementation are the main reasons for the failures of
earlier attempts at stabilisation.
This study takes a closer look at the role of an important element of fiscal adjustment:
the transformation of the deficit financing regime, the interaction between market-
based deficit financing introduced in 1992 as well as debt accumulation and
macroeconomic processes is analysed. Other aspects of fiscal reform are not evaluated
here3. Our objective is to analyse the relationship between the financing need and the
market-based financing regime. In the course of this analysis, the transformation of the
financing need (the fiscal deficit) and of the financing structure is surveyed.
The calculations are carried out for the consolidated fiscal accounts, which include the
central budget, extrabudgetary funds, social security funds and local governments.
They also contain the National Bank of Hungary (NBH), since the central bank had a
significant influence on the financial position of the government in the period under
investigation due to its special financing links4.
In the following we show that the establishment of central bank independence - which
is very similar to arrangements in developed economies - was one of the basic elements
of the new financing regime.
In order to be able to evaluate economic policy it is inevitable (both for the past and
the future) to eliminate the effects of financial flows and debt-linkages between the
central budget and the NBH, since the bulk of Hungary’s sovereign external debt was
in the central bank’s books until the January 1997 debt conversion. Therefore, only the
consolidated public debt indicator reflects the true structure of public debt (external
vs. domestic, foreign exchange vs. local currency), and factors behind the debt
accumulation process should be examined based on this indicator. The study presents a
detailed empirical analysis of the evolution of the financing structure (seigniorage -
debt) as well as of the role and structural changes of debt financing.
                                               
1 This study is an extended version of a chapter in a forthcoming book on the Hungarian fiscal reform
(eds.: L. Bokros - J.J. Dethier, publisher: The World Bank). Zsolt Lovas and Gábor Kiss contributed
to the compilation of the database which we used in our calculations, Roberto Rocha gave us the first
impetus to use this special framework. We are thankful for their help. We are grateful for constructive
criticism and comments on earlier versions of the study to J. J. Dethier, Csaba László, Álmos Kovács,
Ágnes Kerekes, George Kopits, László Náray, Péter Pete, György Sándor, András Simon, György
Surányi, György Szapáry, István P. Székely.  The authors are reliable for all remaining errors.
2 Several studies describe and evaluate the elements of the “Bokros package”, including  Bokros
(1997), Kornai (1997), Surányi (1995), Annual Reports of the National Bank of Hungary 1995, 1996.
3 A working paper of the National Bank of Hungary (Kiss (1998/4)) investigates these aspescts of the
“Bokros package” in details as well as László (1998).
4 A complete consolidation of fiscal accounts would include all major entities with quasi-fiscal activity
(e.g., State Privatization and Holding Company, Eximbank, Hungarian Development Bank, etc.), but
due to the lack of reliable information, this is not even attempted here.
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categories that can be synthetic indicators of the debt accumulation tendencies of the
last more than ten years, while it is obvious that in the period under investigation
numerous regulatory and organisational changes occurred, which affected the role, the
balance sheet structure and the profit of the two institutions involved in deficit
financing - namely the budget itself and the National Bank of Hungary.
This is the reason why we defined the extended consolidated (gross and net) public
debt indicator which - unlike the usual consolidated public debt indicators - includes
short term assets and liabilities of the central bank paying market interest rates.
Therefore, our debt to GDP ratios differ from the official ones as well, but the
indicators we obtained are invariant to the institutional division of tasks, help reveal
future tendencies and determine the basic requirements fiscal policy should fulfil in the
future.
Among the changing (regulatory, institutional conditions, developing money and
capital markets) environment of transition the reliable evaluation of fiscal policy can be
done only by using several indicators reflecting different approaches. Therefore, we
analysed the financing need both in cash flow and accrual basis, and the investigation
of the adjustment process is based on the operational deficit in order to eliminate the
bias due to inflation. The estimations were carried out for the 1986-97 period5,
although the compilation of the time series was rather difficult, since in the beginning
transparency concerning budgetary figures and the financing system was lacking.
Our main objective is to describe the relationship between fiscal policy and the
relatively high inflation (around 20%), which has been more persistent in Hungary
compared to other transition economies. The analysis of past developments in deficit
financing can be an important contribution to formulate the requirements for fiscal
policy in the disinflation period in front of us6. It would have been more obvious to
investigate the period after 1992, when the deficit was financed through government
securities at market rates. Then, however, we would not have been able to demonstrate
the consequences of the magnitude and composition of the inherited debt burden,
which limited the scope of fiscal policy in the first half of the nineties.
In the first and second chapters of the study we attempt to determine the
“responsibility” of fiscal policy in the persistence of moderate inflation in the 1990s
with the help of an overview of major factors influencing Hungarian inflation,
moreover, the macroeconomic relationships of deficit financing are presented. In the
third chapter we demonstrate that - in the face of high indebtedness, moderate inflation
and a developing market for government securities - the characteristics of the fiscal
adjustment process can be assessed only through different measures of the fiscal
deficit. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the dynamics of debt accumulation, the
factors influencing the debt-to-GDP ratio are examined in the different subperiods of
the new, market-based financing regime which was introduced in 1992. In the last
chapter conclusions are drawn which - in our view - should be taken into account
when formulating the deficit financing program of the future periods.
                                               
5 Where it was available, preliminary figures for 1997 are also indicated.
6 On the topic of disinflation see Surányi - Vincze (1998) and NBH Monetary Policy Guidelines,
1998.
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1. Macroeconomic Context of Moderate Inflation in Hungary
In developed economies price stability is the ultimate goal of monetary policy, because
inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, and therefore it can be controlled by the
appropriate use of monetary policy. In transition economies, however, inflation has
several other sources which originate in tensions accumulated in the former centrally
planned economy. The relative price distortions developed in the previous regime make
the higher rate of inflation unavoidable taking into account the relatively sticky nature
of prices, as well as the fact that relative price corrections only rarely take place
through price decreases. Thus, factors determining inflation in transition economies can
be classified as follows:
· factors determined by monetary and exchange rate policy
· fiscal policy;
· relative price changes: elimination of price distortions on the one hand, and relative
price changes due to the catching up of the economy to developed economies on
the other hand;
· expectations and economic policy interests.
 This study investigates factors influenced by fiscal policy, and we would like to answer
the question how fiscal policy of the nineties contributed to the persistence of
moderate inflation. It should be noted at the start, however, that the determination of
the extent and method7 of a tolerable fiscal adjustment was a hard task among the
constraints of the inherited debt burden and social hardships, as well as among the
frictions of the infant government securities market. Tobin’s observation that inflation
is a veil in front of the redistribution of incomes seems particularly relevant under these
circumstances.
 The price and trade liberalisation process, as well as the elimination of different
producer and price subsidies at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s
unavoidably brought about a one-time correction of relative prices (sometimes in
several stages). At the same time, along with the transformation of the micro structure
of the economy, a continuous relative price adjustment began between the tradable and
non-tradable sectors parallel with the gradual development of a profit-oriented business
sector. This relative price adjustment is a continuous endogenous process and it is
related to the increasing productivity of the tradable sector8. (Figure 1.)
                                               
 7 The cost-benefit analysis of budget expenditures and revenues and the analysis of redistribution
effects have not been carried out to date, so the social costs of fiscal adjustment cannot be optimized
theroretically, either.
 8 The distinction between tradable and non-tradable sectors is based on competition with foreign
firms. This competition takes place in foreign markets (export), on the one hand, and in domestic
markets through the substitutability between import goods and domestic production, on the other
hand. The real appreciation typical of the catching up process is related to the Balassa-Samuelson
effect (Halpern-Wyplosz (1997)).
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 Figure 1.
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 The analysis of disaggregated price indices indicated that even at times of greater
demand shocks only a few prices declined actually (Vincze-Zsoldos (1996)), therefore,
the assumption of substantial downward rigidity of prices is justified. The entire period
under investigation was characterised by relative price changes and inflationary
pressures due to them, but a more detailed analysis can separate subperiods with
different characteristics:
 1986-1988 Lower inflation is due to regulated prices.
 1989-1991 Price and trade liberalisation with high inflation. The devaluation of the
Hungarian forint approximately compensated for the inflation difference
between Hungary and its main trade partners.
 Middle of 1991 - beginning of 1995 Inflation peaked in the middle of 1991, afterwards
an ambitious disinflation program was announced which later proved to be
unsustainable. The lesson of the period is that a lower inflation rate achieved by
artificial relative price distortions leads after some time to the accumulation of
tensions whose correction requires measures that result in a turnaround in the
disinflation process9. The maintenance of the (PPI-based) real effective
exchange rate and the “freezing” of energy and utilities prices were the two
basic elements of the 1992 disinflation program. This period was marked by a
spread between consumer and producer prices that grew to 10 percentage
points10. The analysis of prices, profitability and competitiveness in the period is
                                               
 9 That is why the 1998 NBH Monetary Policy Guidelines declared “sustainable inflation reduction” as
the ultimate goal of monetary policy.
 10 The spread between consumer and producer prices was partly a statistical artifact (Darvas et
al.(1994)). Producer price statistics are derived in a gross basis, thus they include energy related
products cumulatively, their weight therefore is much greater in the producer price index than in the
consumer price index.
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not an objective of this study11, but it is important to note that the correction of
artificially maintained relative price distortions was inevitable for the export-
led, sustainable growth. The tension arising from energy prices that diverged
from world prices was among the first things to be eliminated in order to
achieve sustainable growth.
 Since 1995 major developments in relative prices - besides energy price corrections -
have been due to changes in relative prices of tradable and nontradable goods.
Prices in the tradable sector are determined more and more by foreign prices
and the rate of devaluation, while non-tradable inflation regularly exceeded the
growth rate of tradable prices. The explanation for this is partly inflationary
inertia resulting from the persistence of inflation around 20%, but tensions
arising from frictional unemployment in the labour market play an increasing
role. Fast growing productivity in the tradable sector makes the higher growth
rate of wages possible, but it induces higher wage demands resulting in higher
inflation also in the non-tradable sector due to competition for skilled labour.
The privatisation of certain functions formerly performed by the state can also
contribute to higher non-tradable inflation.
 
 
 Figure 2.
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 In the first phase of transition (1991-1994) monetary policy was characterised by too
many ultimate goals, the transformation of policy tools and by unsatisfactory co-
ordination between fiscal and monetary policy (Neményi (1996)). The goals of
monetary policy were hard to define consistently among the changing conditions of the
transition to a market economy, and the continuous changes were detrimental to the
                                               
 11 See Halpern (1996) for a comparative analysis of competitiveness indicators.
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effectiveness of monetary transmission as well. Not even the ultimate goal of monetary
policy could be determined unambiguously, because the high external debt burden was
such a serious constraint that the current account deficit and the maintenance of
external competitiveness entered the central bank’s objective function. After
successfully avoiding a balance-of-payment crisis in 1990, disinflation became the
ultimate goal of monetary policy, but sustainability considerations necessary to ensure
the continuity of the disinflation process were not given enough weight. The “stop-go”
policy of the 1980s continued: in the period of 1990-95 disinflation enjoyed priority
only until the deterioration of the current account forced the devaluation of the
currency. Measures to boost economic growth ignored the requirements of external
equilibrium and disinflation as in the previous decade.
 The requirement of co-ordination among inflation, external competitiveness and
economic growth was made explicit by the crisis that emerged at the beginning of
1995. Monetary policy no longer had an effective tool to contain inflation as the events
of 1993-94 show, when real interest rates were continually increasing, but this could
do nothing to stop the market from losing confidence in economic policy. The budget
deficit could not be financed without the participation of the central bank, and
Hungary’s creditworthiness in international capital markets was in danger. The
unsustainability of the situation was exacerbated by the Mexican crisis at the beginning
of 1995 (Kornai (1997)).
 Figure 3.
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 In the environment of rapidly changing money and capital markets the instability of
money demand did not allow the central bank to follow monetary aggregate targeting
(Riecke (1996), Neményi (1997)). In transition economies structural changes in money
demand and savings due to the development of the financial system12 are natural
                                               
 12 It is worth noting that the stability of money demand in itself is not sufficient for monetary
aggregate targeting. It also needs a reliable model of the real economy which is/was not at the central
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phenomena. This is also reflected in the velocity of monetary aggregates which showed
substantial volatility in the period under investigation, only the velocity of the broadest
money aggregate (M413) seems to be stabilising. Monetary aggregate targeting was
made difficult also by changes in the money multiplier and - from 1995 on - by more
and more intensive capital inflows.
 In these circumstances the choice of the exchange rate as the intermediate target
seemed rather reasonable. The credibility of the fix, but adjustable exchange rate
regime weakened substantially in the 1993-94 period, when devaluations depended on
changes in the priorities among ultimate goals of monetary policy. Regular
devaluations were necessary because the Hungarian inflation rate was permanently
higher than that of the trading partners and because of the deteriorating trade balance.
 Expectations has played an important role in the persistence of inflation since 1988,
and they are also partly responsible for its slow reduction since 1996. Market
expectations usually exceeded official government expectations concerning future
inflation and they were formed backward-looking14. This process was reinforced by the
choice of measures taken at times when policy corrections became unavoidable due to
accumulated tensions. These measures have always had inflationary effects.
 March 1995 was the last time when the central bank and the government “surprised”
the public15 with higher than expected inflation which resulted in an over 10% decrease
in real wages. This problem is known as time-inconsistency, which refers to the fact
that monetary authorities have the advantage of being able to make their decisions in
monetary and exchange rate policy after market expectations are formed. The market
defends itself with higher inflation expectations, which can easily be self-fulfilling. That
is the result is higher inflation, even if monetary authorities did not generate surprise
inflation.
 Hence, as long as time inconsistency is a serious problem, that is the probability of a
possible surprise inflation is high, the influence of inertial elements delaying
disinflation remains strong. The “unexpected” inflation rate of nearly 30% in 1995
naturally pushed wage demands upwards in the following years, which together with
                                                                                                                                      
bank’s disposal. This is well illustrated by the fact that the recession in 1990 was significantly greater
than expected and that in 1995-96 was significantly smaller.
 13 M4 includes the stock of government securities outside the banking system besides cash and bank
deposits.
 14 This can be demostrated by comparing official government targets with the forecasts of several
research institutions. Higher inflation expectations resulted in a higher (or close to the upper limit)
growth of wages than agreed by the representatives of employees, employers and the government
(Blanchard (1997)). Improvements in transparency and credibility are likely result in more forward-
looking expectations.
 15 The adjustment measures of March 1995 (devaluation of 9%, import surcharge, energy price
correction) caused substantial changes in relative prices and income, and at the same time they
created surprise inflation (CPI inflation approached 30%, the spread between PPI and CPI inflation
disappeared). Net wages decreased by a further 5% in 1996. The preannounced crawling band system
( with a ±2.25% band around the parity which was defined relative to a currency basket of 30% USD
70% DEM) was introduced first of all to improve credibility, and because the monthly rate of
devaluation was determined based on the targeted inflation rate, the exchange rate was supposed to
play the role of the nominal anchor. The sustainability of the new exchange rate regime was supported
by a lower budget deficit and a strict income policy.
15
backward-looking wage contracts can make the disinflation process rather costly
(Dornbush-Fisher (1992)). In this situation without credibility improving policy
measures which may include institutional changes as well16 disinflation can be only a
slow process.
 In 1993-1994, the budget deficit was financed by short-term, floating rate securities
from the developing government securities market due to the lack of confidence in
economic policy. Therefore, the budget was quite sensitive to changes in yields which
were based on market expectations of inflation. Thus, the structure of deficit financing
also became an obstacle in the way of disinflation, since the growing financing need
arising from high (rising) interest premium could be met usually only by monetization
(direct financing by the central bank) in the absence of a correction in the primary
budget deficit.
 Before taking a closer look at the role fiscal policy in the explanation of inflation, it is
worth surveying the reasons for policy-makers to use surprise inflation despite the fact
that inflation is unfavourable for the economy in the long run. The motives of using
inflation as an economic policy tool can be divided into three groups (Cukierman
(1992)). We merely note that inflation was occasionally used as an economic policy
tool in the last decade, though the weights of different incentives were varying.
 
 - The employment/growth motive is related to political cycles and was detectable
mainly at the time of early shocks (-1992), but it also appeared in 1994.
 - The current account (external competitiveness) motive was very strong in
Hungary. Devaluations aimed at stopping the deterioration of the current account
led to higher inflation which in turn reinforced devaluation expectations, and
foreign exchange speculation became permanent as a result. Monetary authorities
took some time to regain some credibility even after the introduction of the
preannounced crawling band regime in 1995.
 - Finally, the government revenue motive. As far as seigniorage is concerned, it
played a smaller than expected part in deficit financing. The primary balance of the
budget, however, is not neutral to inflation, especially at times of unexpected
inflation: the effect of higher inflation is felt in the revenue side rather soon, while
the adjustment of expenditures is slower. Therefore, the incentives behind using
inflation as an economic policy tool include other aspects than merely seigniorage
in Hungary.
 These considerations are reflected in expectations, and the inflationary process seems
to have long lags, which shows the signs of hysteresis, even if expectations are rational
and forward-looking. This is important for economic policy, because as long as the
probability of a possible surprise inflation is not small, a decline in inflationary
expectations is not likely, which eventually contributes to the persistence of inflation.
The preannounced crawling band was helpful in reducing inflation in the period of
regaining-creating credibility, after the policy correction of 1995. A basic prerequisite
for this, however, was that fiscal and income policies should be consistent with the rate
of crawl. In the followings, a special aspect of this issue, the interrelation between the
financing need of the budget and its financing, as well as the inflation rate is examined.
                                               
 16 See for example the case of New Zealand.
16
 2. Budget deficit and inflation
 In Hungary - which is a small open economy with a history of fixed exchange rates
(under different regimes)17 - balance of payments considerations could never be
ignored when analysing the relationship between the budget deficit and inflation. It can
be justified empirically that the increasing budget deficit and the growth of domestic
absorption which exceeded the growth of GDP, led directly to the worsening of the
current account balance in the first half of the nineties. In the period before 1995
monetary expansion related to deficit financing directly contributed to inflationary
pressures and it had indirect effects on inflation as well. The steady worsening of the
current account balance necessitated exchange rate corrections which were
accommodated by monetary policy. All this contributed to the persistence of inflation
and sometimes even to jumps in the growth rate of prices. Thus, the budget deficit
indirectly led to inflation through the current account deficit and devaluations.
 
 
 Table 1. Macroeconomic Indicators
 Percentage change unless otherwise indicated
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
 Real GDP  -0.1  -0.7  -3.5  -11.9  -3.1  -0.6  2.9  1.5  1.3  4.4
 Domestic absorption (real)  -2.9  0.9  -3.1  -9.1  -3.6  9.9  2.2  -3.1  0.8  4.2
 M3 (annual average)  ..  ..   26.3  36.4  19.9  14.4  15.1  22.8  18.8
 Net domestic assets*  ..  ..   14.1  10.9  18.9  20.1  22.3  1.9  9.4
 Corporate loans  ..  ..   21.7  5.9  -3,2  12.1  19.2  12.6  37.5
 Current account/GDP  -2.8  -4.9  0.4  0.8  0.9  -9.0  -9.4  -5.4  -3.8  -2.2
 Unemployment(percent of labour
force)**
 0.3  0.4  1.0  4.7  10.3  11.9  10.7  10.2  9.9  8.7
 Inflation (CPI, YoY)  15.5  17.0  28.9  35.0  23.0  22.5  18.8  28.2  23.6  18.3
              (CPI, end - year)  14.8  18.1  33.4  32.2  21.6  21.1  21.2  28.3  19.8  18.4
 * Includes the effect of bank restructuring and debtor consolidation after 1993.
 ** Annual averages. Prior to 1993 registered, from 1993 according to ILO definition from Labour
Force Survey
 In the 1990s the choice between the different methods of deficit financing was
constrained. Since external debt reached critical levels at the end of the eighties,
external financing was seriously limited. The burden of foreign exchange denominated
borrowing were recognised and this was reflected in the new deficit financing regime
introduced in 1992, which took effect after the Central Bank Act (1991 LX. Act) was
passed in Parliament. In the new regime:
· the budget deficit is financed exclusively through the market by issuing government
securities (Treasury bills and bonds);
                                               
 17 Before 1995 the exchange rate regime operated as an adjustable peg. In the preannounced crawling
band regime introduced in March 1995 the exchange rate has been stuck at the stronger edge of the
4.5% wide band at almost all times. Therefore, the regime operated basically as a crawling peg despite
the existence of the band around the parity.
17
· central bank financing of the deficit was limited, since January 1997 any direct
financing by the central bank (that is participation in primary auctions) is prohibited
in accordance with EU norms, which was made possible by the significant
development of the government securities market and by the substantial reduction
in the deficit financing need;
· government securities are purchased by investors (households, corporations and
institutional investors) at their free will according to their investment decisions.
 We must note already in the beginning that - contrary to beliefs - this change in the
financing regime did not increase the costs of deficit financing, and unlimited central
bank financing at preferential interest rates would not have eased the social burdens of
transition to a market economy as some might claim. The most important consequence
of the financing regime reform was that costs18  hidden in the labyrinth of the
previous financing system became explicit, and this meant a major improvement in
the transparency of deficit financing. An increasing share of the real costs of deficit
financing appeared directly in the government’s books, since the budget paid market
interest rates on the new issues of government securities which covered the deficit
financing of the given year plus the refinancing of maturing stock (for more details see
Borbély - Neményi (1995)). In the beginning of the 90s, when repayment of the
accumulated external debt meant a serious problem, the budget was not affected
directly, because foreign exchange debt was in the books of the central bank, and the
government paid preferential interest rates19 on long-term credit from the National
Bank of Hungary. (Further details on the establishment central bank¢s independence
are given in Barabás-Hamecz -Neményi (1998)).
 The endogenous and exogenous shocks in the beginning of the 1990s played a part in
the growth of the budget deficit. The problem was twofold: (i) the rising deficit to
GDP could not be financed from the market since the bad macroeconomic prospects
and the undeveloped state of the government securities market made both domestic
and foreign investors unwilling to invest in forint denominated Treasuries; (ii) changes
in the deficit structure - especially the rising real interest rates - showed the signs of a
potentially explosive debt accumulation process.
 The public sector can be divided into four subsystems and the central bank, but only
two players have a distinguished role in deficit financing: the central budget decides
about financing issues and debt management, and the National Bank of Hungary
decides about financing through the monetary expansion20.
                                               
 18 In the past costs showed up in the reduction of the central bank’s net real wealth due to special
accounting practices. A good description of the mechanism and consequences of this process can be
found in Rocha - Saldanha (1992).
 19 To make it clear we must emphasize the problem was not that the nominal or inflation induced
costs were not observable - our efforts are partly directed to filter these out -, but the identification of
the real costs was nearly impossible in this non-transparent system without a thorough investigation
the easily accessible figures were misleading.
 20  Among the fiscal subsystems local governments have the right to accumulate debt in their own
right. In the beginning of the nineties there were plans to decentralize deficit financing in order to
increase the responsibility of social security funds, but the deficit of social security funds (which
regularly exceeded the planned figure) could not be financed from the market at a reasonable cost,
therefore social security funds were given access to use the account of the budget at the central bank.
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 In light of the fact that the shift to the new financing regime in 1992 coincided with the
rise in the budget deficit, and the government securities market was rather illiquid and
in the first phase of its development, the possibility of direct financing by the central
bank was eliminated only gradually. Macroeconomic aspects and especially co-
ordination between fiscal and monetary policies were assigned primary importance.
Radical fiscal reform, however, was postponed until the escalation of the financing
crisis at the end of 1994. It was obvious from the beginning, but when it turned out
that further monetary restrictions were ineffective21, it became even more evident that
if the central bank withdraws from deficit financing, after some time it will lead to even
larger monetary financing, that is “unpleasant monetary arithmetics” can arise
(Sargent- Wallace (1983)). That is why the prohibition of direct central bank financing
was introduced only gradually. In the first phase of transition (before 1995) the
constraints on direct financing were violated several times, situations arose when
market financing was not possible. This was the case in September 1993, when the
situation was solved by reducing central bank refinancing rates below market rates
(“opening the repotap”), and in 1994, when the direct financing limit of 4% of budget
revenues (56 billion forints) imposed by the Central Bank Act was raised to 80 billion
forints.
 The significant development of the government securities market and the introduction
of the primary dealer system enabled the National Bank of Hungary in 1997 to give up
its functions as a market maker, and now its open market operations are driven by
monetary policy considerations. At the same time central bank financing of the budget
became market-based which means that the NBH does not participate at the primary
issues and has no obligation to provide the budget with funds neither in an indirect
form.
 
 A simple scheme of the relationships between the deficit financing need, debt
accumulation and inflation is summarised in the first part of the Appendix. In chapter 3
and 4 the financing need and its composition are analysed, and chapter 5 contains the
detailed analysis of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
 
 3. Measuring and Financing the Government Deficit in a Transition
Economy
 
 There are several special characteristics of Hungary, which have to be taken into
account when investigating the changes in public debt and in budget financing:
· Current problems can not be understood disregarding the accelerating indebtedness
of the 1980s. The high level of foreign currency denominated debt was the most
important binding constraint for the economic policy in the early nineties, therefore
we analysed more than one decade (1986-1997) for a better understanding of the
impact of the pre-transition period.
                                               
 21 After the negative real interest rates of 1993 a correction process began which produced high ex
ante and ex post real interest rates, but even these could not ensure financing.
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· The deviation between the official deficit of the general government and the
borrowing requirement was large in the first period of transition (Tanzi, (1992)).22
· Privatisation incomes as one-time financing resources decreased the public debt
significantly as from 1995 onwards the bulk of the privatisation revenues was used
to retire government debt.
· In the centrally planned economy the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) pursued
strong quasi fiscal activities, the profit payments to the government were much
lower than the seigniorage due to transfers given by the central bank (Neményi,
(1997)).
· The overwhelming proportion of the foreign debt was held by the NBH,
consequently the clear assessment of the debt burden requires the consolidation of
the balance sheets of the general government and the central bank. (For
methodology of consolidation see Appendix 1.) As a result of the consolidation
cash-flows between the government and the NBH have been filtered out and
financial connections with market participants (residents and non-residents) outside
the general government and the NBH has been revealed in this paper.
· Two different forms of deficit financing are distinguished in our paper:
monetization and debt financing. Items of the central bank liabilities were
separated into two groups: monetary base and debt. The distinction between
monetary base and debt is made according to the interest paid on the liability of the
central bank: monetary base comprises the cash and banknotes plus the mandatory
reserves of commercial banks with below market interest rates. On the other hand
the stock of sterilisation instruments (reverse repo, deposits and sterilisation bonds)
are added to the consolidated public debt as the NBH pays market interest rate on
the stock, and these instruments are to avoid the undesirable money-multiplication.
A monetary base excluding reverse repo, NBH-bonds, HUF and foreign currency
denominated voluntary deposits of commercial banks was used in this paper which
is appropriate for the analysis of capital inflows and sterilised intervention. The size
of monetization was regarded as the change in the monetary base. Due to this
narrow definition of the monetary base the gross consolidated public debt figures
included in this paper exceed official ones. The ¢extended¢ gross public debt
category used in this paper eliminates the deficiency of the official figures, where
sterilised intervention of the central bank decrease the debt/GDP ratio as
sterilisation instruments are not included in the gross public debt. Our gross debt
figures enable us to capture the shift in the denomination structure of the debt due
to the foreign currency market intervention and sterilisation of the NBH.
· In a quickly changing environment the fiscal stance can not be evaluated by one
deficit figure. Large interest rate volatility and shifting timing of interest payments
cause quite significant deviation between cash-flow and accrual budget deficits.
While the cash-flow deficit reflects the actual financing requirement of the general
government, accrual figures contribute to the proper macroeconomic assessment of
the fiscal stance. Under moderate inflation the operational (or real) deficit (Tanzi et
al (1993)), which excludes the distortionary impact of inflation can provide useful
                                               
22 This is reflected in the increasing stock of non-deficit financing public debt (credit-, bank- and
debtor consolidation, transforming of housing loans, assuming the debt of large corporates etc.),
which added more than 10 percentage points to the debt/GDP ratio in 1990-1994.
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information about the actual size of the fiscal adjustment and the demand impact of
the fiscal policy.
· When accomplishing the analysis over a longer period, the deficit calculations have
to be based on changes in public debt because (i) reported cash-flow figures very
often do not reflect actual cash-flows for the whole period of the last ten years, (ii)
a significant part of the increases in the stock of debt was unrelated to the official
deficits, (iii) the methodology of the budget changed several times according to
regulations.
 
 Nominal Deficits (Cash Flow, Accrual Basis balances and Changes in
Public Debt)
 
 Table 2 reports the different figures of the general government balance. It can be seen
that during the nineties the most often used, “headline” cash flow deficit figures
differed sometimes very significantly from the other indicators of the fiscal stance.
 
 Table 2. Indicators of General Government Balances*
 (percent of GDP)
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
 
 1. Cash flow balance  0.3  -3.0  -7.0  -6.5  -8.4  -6.7  -3.1  -4.8
 2. Accrual basis balance  0.3  -3.0  -7.0  -7.7  -9.6  -7.3  -4.6  -4.7
 3. Primary balance  4.3  1.0  -2.6  -2.9  -2.7  1.6  4.3  3.1
 4. Operational balance  -4.7  -3.7  -5.5  -5.1  -5.5  -2.1  +0.6  -0.4
 5. Change in general government gross
debt
 -5.1  8.7  4.0  11.3  -2.1  -2.0  -12.9  -8.3
 * For the lack of information and accounts, the effect of inflation could not be eliminated from
the primary balance (see Kiss (1998)), thus only the interest payments were accounted for
according to the cash, accrual and operational approach.
 
 The divergence between the cash flow and the accrual figures can be basically
explained by the frequency of interest payments applied to government debt and, in
case of short-term debt, by the maturity and timing of issues. The difference between
the cash flow and accrual deficits reflect the fact that the size of interest payments
accounted for in the official deficits strongly depended on the possibility of postponing
cash-flow interest expenditures by issuing government bonds with annual interest
payments. In 1993 and 1996 the restructuring of the cash-flow interest payments, while
in 1995 the accelerating inflation was responsible for the gap between cash-flow and
accrual deficit figures.
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 Table 3. Components of the General Government Cash Flow Balance
 (Percent of GDP)
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997**
 1. Central Government balance  0.6  -3.6  -6.8  -5.1  -6.4  -5.5  -2.0  -4.0
 of which:         
 2. Primary balance  4.6  -0.6  -1.6  -1.2  -0.4  2.9  5.3  4.1
 3. Interest balance  -5.1  -3.3  -5.0  -4.2  -6.5  -8.4  -6.5  -7.9
 4. profit transfer (+) from/transfers for
losses (-) to the NBH
 1.1  0.4  -0.2  0.3  0.5  0.0  -0.8  -0.3
 5. Extrabudgetary funds balance  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.0  -0.2  -0.1  0.1
 6. Social Security Funds balance  0.0  -0.6  -0.6  -1.0  -0.8  -0.7  -1.0  -0.6
 7. Local Governments balance  -0.4  0.8  0.3  -0.8  -1.3  -0.3  0.0  -0.3
 8. General Government balance  0.3  -3.0  -7.0  -6.5  -8.4  -6.7  -3.1  -4.8
 9. of which: primary balance  4.3  1.0  -2.6  -2.9  -2.7  1.6  4.3  3.1
 10. General Government Revenues*   52.3  51.3  53.0  50.4  46.2  45.7  43-44
 11. General Government Expenditures*   55.4  58.4  59.4  59.0  52.8  48.7  48-49
 * GG revenues and expenditures exclude privatisation revenues and are on a consolidated basis.
   (NBH estimates).
 ** Preliminary figures.
 
 The fiscal stance could be more accurately evaluated by the accrual budget deficit
figures in period 1986-97. Accrual budget deficit figures include those liabilities of the
general government, which are due but have to be paid in the future and, as a
consequence, accrual deficit may indicates problems of financing early, when the
government still does not have to face the accrued expenditures. The cash-flow deficit
figures underestimated the accumulating tension in the early 90s, as can be seen in
Table 3. Fiscal policy decisions were based on the cash-flow figures, which might have
contributed to the fact, that the adjustment in the primary balance was postponed until
1995. Using the accrual figures it could have been revealed earlier that a significant
improvement of the primary balance is necessary to avoid the unsustainable path,
which was the result of the vicious circle of high deficit -- increasing public debt --
increasing interest payments.
 
 Table 4. Gross debt of the General Government
 (End of Year Stocks, in Billion HUF)
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
 1. Deficit financing debt of the central
    budget
 465.8  578.5  796.2  1012.9  1215.2  1413.8  1788.1  2200.0
     in per cent of GDP  22.3  23.2  27.1  28.5  27.8  25.4  26.1  26.2
 2. Non-Deficit Related Debt  363.8  374.8  486.1  749.8  859.8  972.3  1289.5  961.7
       in per cent of GDP  17.4  15.0  16.5  21.1  19.7  17.5  19.1  11.5
 3. Fiscal Liability Related to FX losses*  519.2  777.9  888.9  1182.0  1440.1  2023.3  1563.3  1886.7
       in per cent of GDP  24.9  31.1  30.2  33.3  33.0  36.4  23.1  22.5
 4. Liabilities of Extrabudgetary Funds
and Local Governments and SS Funds
 18.5  15.0  16.6  57.4  99.6  104.4  79.9  81.4
 5. Forex Debt of the Government  37.4  118.8  133.9  202.7  236.5  324.1  295.2  332.8
       in per cent of GDP  1.8  4.8  4.6  5.7  5.4  5.8  4.4  4.0
 6. Gross debt of the General Government  1404.7  1865.0  2321.7  3204.8  3851.2  4837.9  5016.0  5463.0
       in per cent of GDP  67.2  74.7  78.9  90.3  88.2  86.2  73.3  65.0
 7. Gross debt at constant 1997 prices  6046.2  6083.5  6209.8  7068.6  7008.6  6862.2  5938.9  5463.0
 *Non-interest bearing debt with the NBH, since 1996 foreign exchange denominated liabilities
to the central bank.
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 Actual public sector deficits were higher than what the cash flow balance figures report
because of so-called off-budget liabilities (i.e. bonds issued for the housing finance
reform, bank restructuring bonds and guarantees). The latter, though they did not have
an immediate macroeconomic impact, contributed significantly to the increase in the
public debt/GDP ratio and of borrowing requirements in later years. A rough estimate
of the true fiscal position of the government is provided by the change in government
debt to GDP. The difference between the change in debt in percent of GDP23 and the
cash-flow deficit to GDP in 1993 was almost 5 percentage points (Table 2. Row 5),
which is an indication of the magnitude of off-budget obligations during the transition.
The non-deficit-financing debt of the general government increased by 4.6 percentage
points to 22 percent of GDP in 1993 and played important role in the intensification of
the debt burden— as reflected by the fact that the gross consolidated debt/GDP ratios
steadily increased until reaching its peak of 100% in 199524 (see Table 5. Row 4. ).
 
 
 Table 5. Consolidated* public debt
 (in percent of GDP)
  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
 
 1. Net consolidated public
debt
 
 31.2
 
 39.9
 
 38.9
 
 44.0
 
 41.8
 
 43.9
 
 46.6
 
 59.3
 
 63.2
 
 59.6
 
 
 52.5
 
 47.6
 
   HUF denominated  -16.7  -14.9  -14.5  -12.0  -12.0  -10.5  1.2  11.3  13.0  18.3  23.8  29.1
   FX denominated  47.9  54.8  53.4  56.0  53.8  54.5  45.4  48.0  50.2  41.3  28.7  18.5
             
    Domestic  -16.7  -14.9  -14.5  -11.1  -5.6  -1.2  9.1  20.9  24.4  30.7  32.1  32.7
    Foreign  47.9  54.8  53.4  55.0  47.5  45.1  37.5  38.4  38.8  28.9  20.3  14.9
             
 Memorandum items             
 2. Gross debt of the general
government
 60.4  67.2  63.3  72.3  67.4  75.0  79.0  90.3  88.2  86.2  73.3  65.1
 3. Monetary base
 
 21.2  21.1  19.7  19.7  16.8  19.9  20.4  17.1  13.9  12.8  12.6  11.8
 4.Gross consolidated debt**  76.1  78.9  70.8  73.6  70.4  81.0  76.3  95.8  96.9  100.9  84.6  75.8
 
 5. Gross consolidated claims  44.9  39.0  31.8  29.6  28.6  37.1  29.7  36.5  33.7  41.3  32.1  28.2
 * Computed by netting out the financing flows between the budget and NBH.
 ** ‘Extended’ gross consolidated public debt: includes all the financial liabilities of the NBH except
the monetary base and claims of the general government on the central bank.
 
 The cash flow deficit is an indicator of the net financing needs of the government. Its
two components, primary balance and interest payments, are shown in Figure 4. The
deterioration in the government's fiscal position became manifest in 1994 as the interest
payments/GDP ratio measured on a cash basis jumped up (his ratio was already higher
and increasing on an accrual basis) and this made unavoidable the need to achieve,
sooner or later, a significant surplus in the primary balance.
 
                                               
 23  Which differs from the change in debt to GDP ratio that will be analysed in Section 5.
 24  It should be noted once again that these are the so called extended figures including sterilization
stocks of the central bank as well.
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 The conventional cash flow deficit measure is a poor indicator of the true fiscal stance
in periods of moderate and volatile inflation. Under such circumstances the volatility of
the cash-flow based figures reflect more the debt managers¢ room for manoeuvre than
an underlying fiscal adjustment in the public sector. For the investigation of the fiscal
stance it is necessary to filter out the inflation compensation part of the interest
payments, to turn to the operational (real) deficit (see Tanzi, Blejer and Teijeiro
(1993)).
 
 Nominal and Operational (Real) Deficits
 
 Since inflation in Hungary has been above 15 percent on an annual basis since 1987,
the changes in the government¢s fiscal position are best evaluated by examining the real
deficit over time— which requires eliminating the inflation compensation component
(i.e. the fact that investors have to be compensated for the effects of inflation) from
interest payments and revenues25.
 
 The calculation of the operational deficit are based on public debt data (gross and net)
derived from the consolidated balance sheets of the general government and the NBH.
(See Appendix 1.) The so called below the line approach was applied - i. e. the general
government balance are measured as the changes in stock of financing (money and
debt) items - in order to avoid problems stemming from unreliable deficit figures. End
of year CPI  was chosen as the relevant price index for HUF denominated items,
although GDP deflator would be a more appropriate price index for the whole
economy. On the other hand the GDP deflator is available in an annual average form
only, which is not compatible with the below the line approach, a reason why we
                                               
 25  In this paper only the interest payments were corrected for the inflation. The problems of correction
of the primary balance are explained in Kiss (1998).
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turned to CPI time series. As a result our operational deficit figures are underestimated
since in the investigated period CPI inflation exceeded price increases calculated from
the GDP deflator.
 
 In order to get operational deficit figures comparable with cash and accrual basis
deficit figures reported by the budget increments of the non-deficit financing debt
were not treated as deficit in the year of the increase, but interest payments (over
inflation) on this type of debt was included in the deficit.
 
 Figure 5. presents the deviation of nominal and real deficits over the period 1986-96. It
is clearly noticeable that, until 1992— the year of the change in the financing regime— ,
real deficits were always larger than nominal (cash-flow) deficits. Theoretically, this
can not happen, since real interest payments are defined as nominal interest payments
minus inflation compensation.
 
 In Hungary, however, the consolidated government (general government + central
bank) had been a net lender to the domestic sector until 1992, and central bank lended
to the corporate sector at preferential, below-market interest rates. These hidden
transfer to the corporates increased the net real interest payments compared to net
nominal ones and resulted in real deficits exceeding nominal deficits during 1986-91 .
 
 Figure 5.
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 Since the inflation compensation component on HUF-denominated debt equals
domestic inflation while that on foreign currency-denominated debt equals foreign
inflation, there is a considerably higher spread between nominal and real interest
payments in the case of HUF-denominated debt. Figure 6. shows the evolution of the
net nominal and real interest payments of the consolidated public debt. During this
period, nominal annual average interest payments were 1.7 percent of GDP over 1986-
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90, then 6.3 percent in 1991-96. By contrast, if we look at interest charges in real
terms, there is no practical difference between the two subperiods with real annual
average interest payments amounting to 3.7 percent of GDP over 1986-90 and 3.6
percent for 1991-96.
 
 Figure 6.
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 From what has been said so far, we can conclude that, in the period 1986-91, the fiscal
position was actually worse than what was indicated by the cash flow deficit figures -
the "headline" deficit figure reported to the public - for three main reasons:
· interest expenditures on the public debt (paid to the central bank) were lower than
market interest rates,
· the budget did not have to carry the full burden of the external debt owed by the
central bank,
· and the domestic corporate sector had been subsidised through central bank
lending at below market interest rates.
 All this helped postpone fiscal adjustment and contributed to the deterioration of public
finances.
 The changes in the operational deficit show that government debt was clearly on an
unsustainable path until 1995. This is supported by the observation that, as shown in
Figure 7, there was a gap between the implicit real interest rate on the debt and the real
growth rate of the economy, requiring the generation of primary surpluses in the
budget. However, this was rarely the case before 1995 and no significant change took
place in the size and structure of the primary balance until the marginal cost of
borrowing increased to a critical level— reflecting the fact that the general government
financial position was unsustainable.
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 Figure 7.
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 As seen in Figure 7, there was a large gap between the real growth rate and the real
interest rate (computed according to the inflationary compensation assumption) on the
net debt. At first glance, the real interest rate, prior to 1992, seems to be "too high"
(around 10 percent), even taking into account the interest payments on the external
debt. There are two reasons for this gap.
· First, the primary deficit for the pre-transition period was under-reported so that
real interest payments, derived as the difference between the operational deficit and
the primary deficit, were overestimated. This under-reporting definitely played a
role given the lack of transparency in fiscal reporting during that period (Kopits
and Craig (1998)).
· Second, before 1992 (Figure 8.), the general government extended large HUF
denominated credits to the private sector and was a net lender in HUF to the
private sector at interest rates below market rates.
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 In order to obtain a more accurate measure of the primary deficit in situations where
the operational deficit is higher than the nominal deficit and where real interest rates on
consolidated general government’s claims are negative— as was the case in Hungary
before 1991— Tanzi, Blejer and Tejeiro (1993) suggest computing a "corrected
deficit." This correction is obtained by reducing implicit real interest rate to a level
equivalent to the trend of real interest rates. In our calculations of the corrected deficit,
we have assumed that the implicit real interest rate of the net debt was the same prior
to 1991 as the average during transition period. This assumption reduces the net
interest payments of the pre-transition period. The results, shown in Figure 9, lead to
the conclusion that primary deficits were higher than reported in the early transition
period and that the reported surpluses of 1988 and 1990-91 would become deficits if
these assumptions could be verified.
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 Figure 9.
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 * Corrected primary balance is derived by assuming that real interest rates did not change over the
observation period.
 
 Thus the true cost of borrowing in the pre-transition period can be discovered only on
the basis of the consolidated public debt when the interest charge on the external
liabilities are taken into account directly. However, the excessively high real interest
rates in the pre-transition can be attributed to the lack of transparency in fiscal
reporting and to hidden transfers to the private sector. This is the reason why we have
calculated the corrected primary deficit figures for the before 1992 period. The implicit
real interest rate on the net debt has stabilised at around 6.5 percent since 1992. It is
important to emphasise that this does not represent the real marginal cost of borrowing
for the government because it also includes the opportunity cost of holding foreign
exchange reserves. The marginal cost can be estimated by assuming that the wedge
between foreign exchange lending and deposit rates of the government is equal to that
prevailing in 1995-96. This estimate yields a marginal cost of 5 to 6 percent in real
terms.
 
 Notwithstanding the correction above made in order to have a clearer picture, it should
be pointed out that, from the point of view of the sustainability of the general debt in
the past, it does not matter which factor was dominant since there is no reallocation of
data that can produce a combination of primary deficits, real interest rates, and real
growth rates that is sustainable.
 
 It is tempting to infer from our analysis of deficits that fiscal policy became looser as
the transition process progressed. Taking into account that GDP fell by almost 20
percent over 1989-92, government revenues and expenditures were very sensitive to
the business cycle. The claim can be made that, in 1991-94, the exogenous (i.e., cycle-
related) part of fiscal expenditures was at least as responsible for the deterioration of
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the fiscal stance as high real interest rates and the recession induced by several real
shocks. We adjusted non-interest revenues and expenditures of the general government
to take this effect into account. We assumed that, every year, potential current
revenues are related to the previous year's current revenue/GDP ratio and to the
growth rate of GDP. For non-interest expenditures, we took the previous year’s non-
interest expenditure/GDP ratio adjusted to the potential growth rate of the economy.
In our calculations we have assumed that after the big bang of 1991 the growth rate of
the potential GDP was still slightly negative because of the fall in both effective labour
and the net capital stock. We have further assumed that after the stabilisation package
of 1995 the potential growth rate of the economy gradually accelerated to 3- 3.5
percent. This is a variation of the “Dutch method” of cyclical adjustment (Chand
1993)26. Table 4 shows the results of this simple ad hoc model. Given the crude nature
of the estimation it is preferable to look at trends in the non-cyclical component rather
than at actual levels. The primary deficit deviated from its trend level for non-cyclical
reasons until 1995, most strikingly in 1994. As a result of the adjustment policy
initiated in 1995, the primary deficits in 1995 and 1996 were below their cyclical levels
loosening of fiscal policy is evident for 1997.
 
 Table 6. Non-cyclical Component of the Primary Deficits
 (Percent of GDP)
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
 Non-cyclical total  2.1  -0.6  2.0  -3.5  -2.2  1.6
 
 
 4. The Financing of the Consolidated General Government Deficit
 
 Table 7. shows the sources of financing of the operational deficit of the consolidated
general government: seigniorage (defined as change in the monetary base), changes in
net credit to the economy by NBH, changes in the stock of domestic deficit financing
debt, changes in the net foreign currency liabilities (without revaluation gains/losses)
and privatisation revenues.
 
                                               
 26 Given the non-transparent nature of fiscal accounts and the incidence of lot of special events in this
period the actual estimation is much more complicated, the details of it can be found in (Kiss 1998).
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 Table 7. Operational deficit and its financing
 (per cent of GDP)
  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
 1. Operational deficit  3.7  6.3  4.0  4.8  4.7  3.7  5.5  5.1  5.5  2.1  -0.6  0.1
 (2+3+4)             
 2. Net seigniorage (2a-2b)  0.8  2.0  1.5  3.1  0.3  4.5  2.7  0.0  -0.5  1.3  1.4  1.0
 2a. Gross seigniorage
 2b. Interest payments on
mandatory reserves
 1.1
 0.2
 2.3
 0.3
 1.7
 0.2
 3.3
 0.2
 0.6
 0.3
 5.8
 1.3
 3.5
 0.8
 0.2
 0.2
 0.0
 0.5
 2.0
 0.7
 2.1
 0.7
 
 1.6
0.6
 3. Forint denominated financing
(3a.-3b.+3c.)
 -0.7  1.4  0.1  0.6  1.3  1.8  7.3  1.1  3.0  2.0  4.4  5.1
 3a. Government debt
outside the central bank
 0.1  0.0  0.3  0.9  -0.1  0.8  3.4  3.7  1.2  0.6  2.6  0.4
 3b. Central bank financing of the
private sector
 0.8  -1.4  0.3  0.3  -1.4  -2.0  -4.9  -0.3  -1.5  -2.3  -2.5  -3.7
 3c. Privatisation revenues  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.9  -1.0  -3.0  -0.3  -0.8  -0.7  1.0
 4. Foreign currency denominated
financing (4a.+ 4b.)
 3.5  2.8  2.4  1.1  3.0  -2.6  -4.5  4.0  3.1  -1.2  -6.4  -6.1
 4a. Net forex liabilities  3.5  2.8  2.4  1.1  3.0  -3.6  -5.9  0.6  2.6  -8.6  -7.8  -7.7
 4b. Privatisation revenues  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.4  3.4  0.5  7.4  1.4  1.6
 
 Since examining these financing items separately may give a distorted picture of the
interrelated economic processes underlying them, we have reclassified financing flows
into three broad categories:
 
· Net seigniorage:  monetary seigniorage corrected by the interest paid on
mandatory reserves by the central bank,
· Market domestic currency financing: the domestic currency financing defined
above minus changes in net credit to the economy by NBH, and
· Foreign currency financing: changes in net foreign currency financing minus
privatisation revenues (in foreign currencies).
 
 The rationale for this reclassification is that, since the operations of NBH also covered
quasi-fiscal central bank activities, monetary seigniorage in Hungary differs
significantly from the government¢s revenue from money creation. (Thus it is relevant
to present seigniorage as a source-and-use approach (Klein-Neuman, 1990).) Only
interest payments on mandatory reserves— the non-negligible costs of the monetary
base— was taken into account when computing net seigniorage.
 
 The results are shown in Table 7. and, graphically, in Figure 10. Since privatisation
revenues were used to retire net foreign currency debt, the adjusted forex financing—
defined as the difference between foreign exchange finance and the foreign currency
part of privatisation revenues— shows the endogenous part of the increase in external
sources. The same logic applies to the domestic part, where it can be assumed that
banks reacted to the changes in interest rates set by the NBH by reallocating their loans
and free reserves at the central bank.
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 Figure 10.
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 The main changes in deficit financing taking place over the last decade could be
identified from the figures above. In the second half of the 1980s, foreign-currency
financing dominated and HUF-denominated market finance was negligible (as the
government provided cheap finance to the state-owned sector with the intermediation
of the central bank). The foreign debt position deteriorated in the early 1990s. The
state refrained from further borrowing abroad in 1991-92 but the growing current
account deficit led to a new wave of external debt in 1993-94. In 1995, as a result of
the adjustment program, general government borrowing needs were cut significantly
and could be covered from domestic sources.
 Net seigniorage— in percent of GDP— was fairly volatile over 1986-96, with a
maximum value of 4.9 percent in 1991 and a minimum value of -0.8 percent in 1994.
There was no permanent increase or decrease in the level of gross seigniorage over
1986-96 and only slight reductions in the average net seigniorage with two
distinguishable subperiods (1986-91 and 1992-96). Prior to the introduction of the new
regime in general government financing, seigniorage revenues fluctuated between 0.3
and 3 percent of GDP, peaking in 1991 at 4.9 percent when inflation reached its high.
Since 1992 seigniorage has not played a more important role in Hungary than in
developed market economies. After 1992, the government could not rely heavily on
money creation as a source of finance, as a new arsenal of savings instruments
(government and corporate securities, pension and investment funds, etc.) developed
and an increasingly larger part of domestic savings went directly to the budget or to the
corporate sector. Surprisingly in the years of financial crises both gross and net
seigniorage declined considerably - though the central bank could not avoid to
participate in the direct financing of the budget - because market participants were
unwilling to hold the domestic currency. Money demand always declined when
inflationary pressure increased, which resulted in a decrease in the tax base of
seigniorage (Table 8.).  The continuous financial innovation also lowered the
cash/GDP ratio and the tax base of the seigniorage. The high mandatory reserve ratio
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needed some compensation, therefore near market interest rates were paid on required
reserves. All this clearly indicates that in an open economy money financing is unable
to remedy the problems of financing, it only postpones the necessary adjustment.
 
 Table 8. Components of seigniorage
 (in percent of GDP)
  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
 1. Gross seigniorage
(1.1+1.2)
 1.1  2.3  1.7  3.3  0.6  5.8  3.5  0.2  0.0  2.0  2.1  1.6
 1.1 Change in real
monetary base
 0.0  0.2  -0.9  0.3  -4.2  1.1  -0.1  -3.0  -2.7  -0.9  0.0  -0.3
 1.2 Inflation tax  1.1  2.1  2.6  3.0  4.8  4.7  3.6  3.2  2.7  2.9  2.1  1.9
 2. Interest paid on
mandatory reserves
 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  1.3  0.8  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.6
 3. Net seigniorage
(1.- 2.)
 0.8  2.0  1.5  3.1  0.3  4.5  2.7  0.0  -0.5  1.3  1.4  1.0
 
 Our results concerning the size and role of seigniorage in financing the budget differ
significantly from other authors’ estimations (Oblath-Valentiny (1993), Kun (1995)
and Hochreiter et al (1996)).
 
 According to our computation, in 1993 the gross seigniorage amounted to the 0.2% of
GDP and if the interest payment on the mandatory reserves are taken into account the
government did not have seigniorage. Using the same (monetary seigniorage) approach
Hochreiter at al. (1996) estimated 4.2% seigniorage in percent of GDP for Hungary.
The most important difference can be attributed to the definition of monetary base. As
we have already noted, this is a crucial point from the point of view of the analysis of
budget financing in Hungary. A significant part of commercial banks’ claims on the
central bank - the stock of sterilisation instruments and foreign exchange deposits -
was excluded because of two reasons. First, the NBH pays market interest rate,
therefore does not collect seigniorage revenues on these stocks. Secondly, these claims
on the NBH do not play a role in the money multiplication, on the contrary the NBH
applies them to squeeze liquidity from the market. A wider monetary base - for
example which was used by Hochreiter et al. (1996) - would overestimate government
income from monetization. (For details see Barabas-Hamecz (1996)).
 
 Our results differ also from those authors¢ results who used opportunity cost approach
(Kun (1995) and estimated 3-4% annual seigniorage over 1991-1995. The difference
between the estimations of monetary and opportunity cost seigniorage can be
explained by the change in the marginal costs of government borrowing in the nineties
reflected by the opportunity cost figures. We believe, however, that in the analysis of
budget financing - and so in this paper as well - the monetary seigniorage should be
applied. The opportunity cost approach may provide useful information about the
portfolio decisions of investors and the changes in the propensity to hold money.
 
 5. Factors influencing the indebtedness
 
 Real interest rates have been above the real GDP growth rates for the whole period,
pushing the debt/GDP ratio up until it peaked in 1995 at 85.0 percent.  Until 1995, this
was not counterbalanced by an adjustment in primary deficits. Moderate inflation
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provided 1 to 3 percent in additional finance (inflation tax) to the government. As a
result, the primary balance corrected by the seigniorage could not alleviate the
increasing debt burden until the fiscal adjustment of 1995 (4% primary surplus).
Increasing real interest on Treasuries led to an increasing PSBR that required either
higher monetization or higher prices on the debt, so that the "snowball effect"
accelerated during 1993-94. The steadily increasing interest rate did not convince
investors to buy forint denominated assets. They only became willing to invest in forint
denominated assets after the perceptible devaluation of the forint.
 
 The debt/GDP ratio was affected by denomination structure of the public debt and
exchange rate movements. In 1992 Hungary experienced a temporary decrease in
foreign currency denominated debt/GDP ratio due to the real appreciation of the forint.
As the current account deficit deteriorated in 1993-94, it became impossible to
significantly reduce the foreign exchange-denominated part of the debt and therefore
the debt/GDP ratio. This only became possible after March 1995 when the credibility
of economic policy improved.
 
 Table 9. Components of changes in net consolidated public debt/GDP ratio
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1991
-
1994
 1995  1996  1997  1995
-
1997
          
 I. Net consolidated public debt
    to GDP (%)
 43.9  46.6  59.3  63.2   59.6  52.5  47.6  
          
 II: Changes in net consolidated
public debt/GDP (1.-2.+3.-
4.+5.+6.+7.)
 2.1  2.7  12.7  3.9  21.4  -3.6  -7.1  -4.9  -15.6
   1. Primary balance  -0.2  2.7  2.8  2.7  8.0  -1.6  -4.2  -3.2  -9.0
   2. Net seigniorage  4.5  2.7  0.0  -0.5  6.7  1.3  1.4  1.0  3.7
   3. Changes in non-deficit financing
debt
 0.0  2.9  7.8  1.0  11.7  -0.1  -0.1  -0.6  -0.8
   4. Privatisation revenues  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.8  1.7  6.6  0.7  2.6  9.9
   5. Combined effect (a.+b.)  8.8  5.7  2.5  1.1  18.1  2.3  2.6  1.0  5.9
          a. real growth effect  5.6  1.3  0.3  -1.7  5.6  -1.1  -0.9  -2.0  -4.0
          b. real interest rate effect  3.2  4.3  2.3  2.7  12.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  10.0
   6. Real exchange rate effect  -2.3  -3.1  -4.9  -0.2  -9.5  5.0  -0.8  -1.0  3.2
   7. Others  0.3  -2.4  4.9  -0.3  2.5  -1.4  -2.5  2.5  -1.3
          
 Memorandum items:          
   Changes in real exchange rate*  96.4  94.4  88.5  99.5   110.6  98  96  
   Implicit real interest rate  6.7  9.6  4.8  4.8   5.6  5.9  6.0  
  GDP growth  -11.9  -3.0  -0.6  2.9   1.8  1.5  4.4  
 *Changes in real exchange rate was calculated by the GDP deflator, values below 100 indicate
real appreciation.
 
34
 In Table 9. the components of changes in net consolidated debt have been depicted.
The 1990s can be divided into two remarkably different subperiods: between 1991 and
1994 net consolidated public debt jumped 21.4 percent of GDP, while in 1995-97 it
dropped 15.6%. The spectacular (more than 35% of GDP) difference in debt dynamics
can be explained by four main factors:
 
· Improvement in the primary balance is responsible for the largest proportion of the
difference (17% of GDP).
· Increases in non-deficit financing debt (12% of GDP) pushed net debt higher only
in the first subperiod.
· The acceleration of privatisation lowered the net debt by more than 8% of GDP in
the second period.
· The drastic drop in GDP, and the following recovery explains approximately 10 %
of the difference between the two subperiods.
Furthermore movements in real exchange rate had an opposite impact on the net debt.
Between 1991 and 1994 due to the large proportion of the foreign currency
denominated debt the real appreciation of the HUF decreased the net debt significantly
by 9.5% of GDP. As the proportion of the foreign currency denominated debt
diminished the real appreciation effect also declined: because of the 9% devaluation of
the forint in 1995 real depreciation caused an increase of 3.2 of GDP in the net debt
between 1995 and 1997.
Assessing the components behind the considerable drop in debt ratio in 1995-97, the
most important factor was the impact of the privatisation revenues (9.9%). Despite of
the major adjustment in the primary balance two-thirds of the decrease in the debt ratio
stemmed from privatisation receipts. This indicates that in a period when the
government can not rely on incomes from privatisation taming down the debt ratio is a
slow and difficult process.
Structural Changes in Public Debt
Table 7 and Figure 10 report domestic and foreign currency financing rather than the
conventional domestic versus foreign financing. The difference between the two is the
foreign currency financing by residents. There were marked changes in domestic versus
foreign currency financing during the period. Our estimates show that, for the 10-year
period as a whole, there was no foreign currency financing, indeed net foreign
currency denominated debt declined by more than 20% of GDP. However the size of
the FX denominated debt in 1994 exceeded the 1985 level by some 10 percent of
GDP, indicating that changes in the structure of deficit financing, the shift from foreign
to domestic sources was particularly strong in 1995-97 with the FX-denominated debt
dropping by an annual average of more than 10 percent of GDP. Domestic financing
during the pre-transition period was dominated by passive forms of financing, i.e. by a
credit crunch to the private sector by the NBH. Active or totally voluntary financing
was minimal— at about 20 percent of all domestic currency financing— in this period.
The transition, however, witnessed a marked increase in the active or voluntary forms
of domestic financing— to about 45 percent of domestic currency financing— and as a
consequence NBH’s direct influence diminished over time.
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An interesting aspect of this evolution is the considerable change in the denomination
and residential structure of the public debt. The denomination of net public debt is
shown in Figure 11. It significantly influenced the difference between real and nominal
government interest payments and the spread between real and nominal deficits. Until
1991 net foreign currency debt exceeded net debt, the consolidated government was a
net creditor in HUF. In 1986-1990, the government extended net credit to the private
sector of about 13 percent of GDP.
Figure 11.
Net consolidated public debt and its HUF and foreign currency 
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The residential (domestic-foreign) structure of the public debt is shown in Figure 12.
Prior to 1989 the general government deficit was wholly financed from abroad, the
proportion of the domestic debt started to increase in 1990 and climbed up to 70
percent of total net debt by end-1997.
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Figure 12.
Net consolidated public debt and its domestic and foreign components
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After 1995, both the denomination and residential structure of the public debt were
influenced by three factors already mentioned in section 1. First, the development of
government securities markets accelerated: they have deepened and become more
liquid. Second, public sector borrowing requirements have been significantly reduced
by the adjustment measures implemented in 1995-96. Finally, the capital flows reversal
as the capital outflow prior to 1995 returned strengthened by the liberalisation of
capital account transactions and the introduction of the convertibility of the Hungarian
forint.
As a consequence of these factors, the main characteristics of public debt has been
transformed. The average maturity increased, and in mid-1997 Hungary has a yield
curve with a seven-year time horizon. The restored credibility of economic policy
pursued and the crawling peg exchange rate regime made Hungarian forint investments
more attractive for resident and non-resident investors. These developments—
especially in capital inflows— have led to a significant change in the ownership
composition of the external debt. The share of state (NBH and government) holdings
in external debt has been declining, while private sector gross indebtedness has grown
rapidly (Table 10.).
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Table 10. Foreign Exchange Debt of Hungary*
(shares of total)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
I. Gross debt
  1. NBH 83.5 79.2 75.2 75.9 72.1 68.8 62.2 54.3
  2. Government 2.4 6.6 7.5 8.3 8.2 6.5 7.1 7.5
  3. Financial institutions 8.5 8.8 8.4 7.5 8.6 9.4 14.1 20.9
  4. Enterprises 5.7 5.3 8.9 8.3 11.1 15.3 16.6 17.2
I. Total (1+2+3+4) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
II. Net debt
  1. NBH 101.9 82.1 86.0 79.5 71.2 59.1 50.8 35.8
  2. Government 1.9 7.7 11.0 12.3 11.4 9.7 8.5 11.2
  3. Financial institutions 4.4 3.6 2.2 3.4 7.6 13.0 15.5 22.1
  4. Enterprises -8.1 6.5 0.7 4.8 9.8 18.2 25.1 30.9
I. Total (1+2+3+4) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Excluding intercompany loans.
Capital Inflow and its Impact on Public Debt
The story of how Hungary’s public debt was restructured is a process which has both
fiscal and non-fiscal aspects.27  The surge in capital inflows provided an opportunity to
change the forint- and forex-mix in the denomination of the debt. But this, however,
had non-negligible costs that had to be factored into the policy design.  Although
Hungary has the highest inflow of foreign direct investment in the Central and Eastern
European region (with an average of $1.2 -1.5 billion per year), non-debt capital
inflows were not always sufficient to cover the external borrowing needs stemming
from the steadily deteriorating current account. After March 1995 the current account
improved considerably, capital inflow accelerated and the excess liquidity stemming
from this became the major challenge facing monetary policy.
The NBH followed a policy of sterilisation of these inflows: the central bank
intervened on the lower edge of the pre-announced band to prevent the exchange rate
from further appreciation and sterilised the excess forint liquidity. (Under the pre-
announced crawling band regime the central bank has an obligation to intervene at the
edges of the ± 2.25 percent width band.)
                                               
27 A detailed analysis is provided in Neményi J. (1996), "Capital Inflow, Macroeconomic
Equilibrium, The Public Debt and The Profit and Loss of the National Bank of Hungary."
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Figure 13.
Monetary base and its components
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The composition of capital inflows changed since the new regime was introduced.
Interest arbitraging elements started to grow in mid-1994 when monetary policy was
tightened by increasing domestic interest rates. The introduction of the new exchange
rate regime gave a further impetus to these inflows, which increased due to high spread
between domestic and foreign interest rates taking into account the depreciation of the
forint. Until the last quarter of 1995 enterprises and commercial banks— certainly those
with access to foreign sources— were also seeking foreign loans. When domestic
interest rates and current account deficit started to decline the proportion of interest
arbitraging capital inflows diminished. As Hungary was upgraded by major
international credit rating agencies, the share of the country in international investment
funds increased, which added to the capital inflow, mainly in late 1996 and early 1997.
The Budapest Stock Exchange was booming in 1996 due to the large sums (around
$750 million) non-residents invested in Hungarian equities.
The surge in capital inflow and the sterilised intervention of the NBH resulted in a shift
in the structure of the debt: on the one hand, the increasing official forex reserves
allowed some additional amortisation of the external debt but, on the other hand, the
public debt denominated in forint increased significantly because of sterilisation
activity.
Figure 13. clearly shows how the accumulation in net foreign currency denominated
assets of the central bank was offset by the decreasing stock of net forint denominated
assets. Due to the active sterilisation policy of the NBH the annual growth rate of the
monetary base remained under control in the range of 15-20%. What were the tools
used for sterilisation?  In 1995, the NBH sold substantial share of its portfolio of
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government securities (more than HUF 80 billion) to sterilise capital inflows.  In 1996
"reverse repos"28 became the main tool of sterilisation.  The government was cautious
in using privatisation revenues because the largest part of these non-recurring incomes
had been spent on debt reduction by pre-payment in order to smooth the monetary
aggregates and keep the fiscal stance in line with longer-run stabilisation.  Budget
borrowing requirements had been cut and could be financed from the market. When
capital inflows were the strongest, the government recognised that the most cost-
effective way of sterilisation was if the budget took part in the sterilisation by issuing
more securities than its net borrowing requirement and depositing the excess amount at
the central bank.
Since a large proportion of the intervention stemmed from permanent items, the NBH
intended to increase the average maturity of the sterilisation instruments. In the lack of
marketable Treasuries, the central bank decided to squeeze liquidity by offering 6-
month and 12-month deposit facilities and in June 1997 the central bank issued its own
bill with maturity of year.
Due to the active NBH sterilisation policy, the decline in interest rates lagged behind
what the government had hoped for but ex post it is difficult to say that a more
ambitious interest rate reduction would have been feasible. The second half of 1995
was the period of regaining investors’ confidence and this always requires some
interest sacrifice. Until the interest differential became large, the sterilised intervention
was quite expensive— especially in 1995, when domestic interest rates were high, well
over parity. Based on estimations of the average interest differential, the excess
expenditures related to the sterilisation approached 1 per cent of GDP in 1995, falling
below 0.5 per cent of GDP in 1996.  This cost appeared in the profit and loss account
of the NBH which, having already deteriorated in the second half of 1995, turned to a
significant loss in 1996. On the benefit side of a cost-benefit evaluating of the
sterilisation policy, it should be mentioned that the inflow of capital allowed the
government to swap the forex debt into HUF-denominated securities and alleviated the
external debt burden.
6. Conclusions
The analysis of different deficit indicators showed that during transition:
· the traditional cash flow balance did not reflect the true nature of fiscal policy. This
can be explained by the gradual shift to market-based financing and the
restructuring of public debt.
· The accrual basis balance was a better indicator of fiscal policy, but it was still
significantly distorted by the inflation component of nominal interest rates.
Exchange rate losses were not appropriately accounted for by the statistics,
therefore, in a period when the restructuring of public debt is substantial, the ratio
of external and internal (forint denominated) debt is changing, the cash flow
balance and its changes can be misleading.
                                               
28 Reverse repurchase agreements, which are one-week and one-month deposit facilities with the central bank,
collateralized by government securities.
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· As long as inflation is high, it is indispensable to calculate the operational deficit
indicator in order to be able to reliably analyse the fiscal stance.
 
 The fiscal transparency was reduced by the fact that a substantial part of public debt
could only be shown by taking into account the balance sheet and income statement of
the central bank. The comparison of different deficit indicators reveals that the
unsustainability of fiscal policy was signalled both by the accrual basis and the
operational deficit indicators well before 1995. The analysis of the operational deficit
shows that the adjustment program in March 1995 was not only the result of the fiscal
policy conducted in the first half of the decade - which was shown also by the cyclically
adjusted primary balance -, but it was the consequence of accumulated tensions that
were hidden in the non-transparent financing system of the 1980s as well.
 In the 1980s domestic financing of the budget deficit was carried out mainly by direct
lending to the government. Voluntary financing methods based on investment
allocation decisions hardly existed, direct lending by the central bank was unlimited. By
the second half of the 1990s, the net financing need of the budget could be covered
from the domestic government securities market. Over the last ten years the structure
of deficit financing and of public debt by currency denomination and by investors has
been transformed, since 1995 forint-denominated financing by domestic investors has
become predominant. This is due to the followings:
· The financing need decreased substantially.
· The liquidity of the government securities market has increased and its
development accelerated as far as the number of instruments and institutional
characteristics are concerned.
· The Hungarian forint became convertible and capital controls were gradually
eliminated.
· The credibility of monetary policy strengthened and capital inflows were
substantial.
 Due to the factors mentioned above, the transformation of the debt structure can be
characterised by the following:
· The duration of forint denominated debt increased, a benchmark yield curve is now
available up to five years.
· Forint denominated investments have become attractive both for domestic residents
and foreign investors.
· The shares of forint denominated debt and holdings of domestic investors have
increased within public debt.
 
 Change in deficit financing over the last ten years
 - 1991 - unlimited direct financing by the central bank
 Our calculations - based on the net consolidated debt of the central bank and the
budget - indicate that in the previous financing regime the true financing need is likely
41
to have regularly exceeded the official budget deficit figure. This was hard to
recognise because of the lack of transparency both in the government’s books and in
the financing system: the budget received basically unlimited credit from the central
bank at a preferential interest rate, therefore, the true costs of external debt
accumulation did not appear directly in the government’s books, they were instead
financed by the loss of central bank wealth. This loss could be identified by the fact that
the profit of the National Bank of Hungary had been well below seigniorage revenues
throughout the period. This profit was reduced by costs of quasi-fiscal activities. The
public sector (the budget and the central bank) was a net lender in this period in
Hungary, that is it carried out the financing of the mostly state-owned corporate
sector. The increasing financing need was covered by foreign borrowing. Hence, the
roots of the financing crisis peaking in 1994 can undoubtedly be found in the
irresponsible debt accumulation of the second half of the 1980s.
 1992 - 1994 - the years of postponed fiscal adjustment
 This period can be regarded as the drift to the path of explosive debt accumulation.
The primary budget deficit was not particularly high (only 1-2% of GDP), and its
deterioration can well be explained by developments in the real sector. As a result of
the new market-based financing regime, an increasing share of the costs of the
accumulated debt appeared directly in the budget. Rising interest payments lie behind
the growing deficit, which took decision makers as a surprise, since they had not
experienced a situation like this before. The adjustment was postponed due to: (i) the
lack of transparent accounting, (ii) official optimism delaying the recognition of the
debt spiral, and (iii) forecasts which considered the signs of an imminent
macroeconomic crisis (first of all the current account deficit) as temporary. It is
doubtful, however, that in 1993 - at the deepest point of the crisis, among the
conditions of increasing financial discipline and of external and internal shocks - the
private sector (firms and households) would have tolerated further substantial fiscal
restrictions. The detailed analysis of the primary balance showed that cyclical effects
were quite strong in this period, and there was no significant fiscal loosening in 1992-
94 compared to the previous periods. The external debt accumulated in the 1980s,
however, was a serious constraint for the fiscal policy of transition.
 A surprising result of the analysis is that even though the National Bank of Hungary
participated actively in the financing of the rising deficit monetary deficit financing was
not rising. Seigniorage did not exceed 1% of GDP on average. The reaction of market
players was remarkably fast: the demand for forint dropped immediately as inflation
and devaluation expectations increased and the yields on new investment instruments
became attractive.
 Central bank interest rate hikes in themselves could not have prevented the debt
accumulation process stemming from the mutually reinforcing relationship between
rising real interest rates and an increasing deficit financing need. While the relationship
of monetary and fiscal policies were characterised by the lack of co-ordination,
monetary policy measures themselves were sometimes contradictory (e.g., an interest
rate hike and a cut in the required reserves ratio at the same time).
 The financing crises was aggravated by a serious credibility crisis. By the end of the
period, interest rate policy lost its effectiveness. High interest rates had no
antiinflationary effect, instead they fed inflation and devaluation expectations.
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Government securities became the safest investments for the banking sector, because at
the real interest rates prevailing at that time corporate financing was rather risky due to
moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
 The textbook relationship of growing deficit ®  increasing central bank financing ®
escalating monetization ®  rising inflation did not work in this direct form. The
already fairly low seigniorage (gross and net) of the period was continuously
decreasing in 1992-94. Despite the fact that the central bank’s provided additional
finance to the budget using indirect channels (i.e. provided refinancing credits to the
banking sector at a lower interest rate than market rates) in 1993, monetary aggregates
were not expanding, because part of the surplus liquidity was absorbed by the increase
of foreign exchange savings and the other part financed the rising deficit of the current
account directly.
 1995 - 1996 - fiscal adjustment creates the conditions for sustainable growth
 As the international experience shows, the fiscal adjustment of March 1995 was based
on measures (devaluation, import surcharge) which characterised countries whose
stabilisation attempt was less successful (Alesina - Perrotti (1997), Kiss (1998)).
Therefore, the main question was whether - under the temporary protection of these
measures - other reforms in the different subsections of the general government, which
were vital for sustainable growth, could be carried through. This issue is beyond the
scope of this study, but we can state that reforms have been gradually implemented
over the last three years which contributed to a reduction in the financing need and to
the turnaround of the debt accumulation process. The deficit financing need decreased
by more than 4 percentage points in two years, partly due to the primary surplus. The
interest payment-to-GDP ratio has been declining since 1996, partly as a consequence
of decreasing interest rate premia. The reduction in the interest rate premium is also
due to declining indebtedness which is a result of external debt retirement financed by
privatisation revenues and capital inflows. The current account deficit is substantially
lower than in the previous period (2,2% of GDP in 1997) and it can be financed by
non-debt type capital inflows (that is foreign direct investment). Substantial export
growth by foreign-owned companies operating in Hungary played an important role in
the decline of the current account deficit in 1997. The improving external balance is the
result of both the fiscal adjustment as well as the privatisation process and foreign
direct investments. The shift in the debt structure to forint denominated instruments
had no significant extra costs, since the interest premium has reduced substantially.
 Continuing fiscal reform
 During the nearly three years (March 1995 - end 1997) of the stabilisation process the
net debt-to-GDP ratio declined by more than 15 percentage points to 47% of GDP.
Three factors had an influence on the debt-to-GDP ratio besides real interest rates and
economic growth: (i) privatisation revenues as one-time financing sources, (ii) the
change in the denomination structure of the debt (the share of forint denominated debt
increased), and the slight real appreciation of the forint following the 10% real
depreciation in 1995, (iii) significant primary surpluses in 1996-97.
 As far as the future is concerned, sustainable growth, further disinflation, and in the
medium-long term price stability will be the main goals of economic policy. While it is
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obvious that stable economic growth is inevitable for the convergence process, a recent
major change is that disinflation has become a condition for sustainable growth. Real
appreciation will accompany the catching up process to developed economies, and
economic policy will face the difficult task of manoeuvring between trying to avoid
significant real appreciation which would lead to competitiveness losses and the
deterioration of the current account, as well as achieving real appreciation at the
lowest inflation rate possible with the help of co-ordination between monetary and
fiscal policies.
 Strict monetary policy is vital for disinflation, but it cannot be effective without the
support of fiscal policy. Put it in other way: both policies need to have independence,
but this independence needs to be curbed, because policy co-ordination is crucial. For
monetary policy this seemingly contradictory requirement means that a more flexible
exchange rate is needed in order to improve the effectiveness  of interest rate policy.
The independence of fiscal policy can be created by further reductions in indebtedness.
In the followings, at the end of the study, factors determining the scope of monetary
and fiscal policies will be investigated.
 The analyses in the previous chapters support the supposition that several factors may
seriously limit the effectiveness of monetary policy in the future. Under the
circumstances of financial innovation, liberalisation and globalization the monetary
transmission mechanism is constantly changing, which makes the forecast of the
expected effects of monetary policy measures difficult. Disintermediation also reduces
the effectiveness of monetary policy. The independence of monetary policy is
significantly curtailed by the current exchange rate regime, the preannounced crawling
band with a narrow band which has basically worked as a fixed exchange rate so far.
This exchange rate regime was an important contribution to regaining the credibility of
economic policy in the last three years, but the quasi-fixed exchange rate can constrain
interest rate policy and increase inflation inertia in the future. Furthermore, the quasi-
fixed exchange rate regime does not enable monetary policy to be restrictive both in
the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the one hand, monetary policy can put
pressure on wage growth in the tradable sector by real appreciation, but the real
interest rates belonging to this exchange rate policy are too low for active disinflation.
On the other hand, if the central bank intends to maintain high real interest rates, the
rate of devaluation can decrease only slowly which allows wages in the tradable sector
to grow faster. Therefore, the effectiveness of monetary policy decisions can be
improved in the future by a managed floating exchange rate regime with a wider band.
In the current quasi-fixed regime when monetary policy is not independent, further
fiscal adjustments are vital for the disinflation process.
 As our empirical analysis of the last ten years shows, in the transition period fiscal
policy played a role in the persistence of moderate inflation, later in disinflation
through different - direct and indirect - channels. The reduction of the budget deficit
was a key element in the sustainability of the exchange rate regime. The high (nearly
6% of GDP) operational deficits of the 1992-94 period reflected the increasing
demand- and inflationary impact of the government, as a consequence of the fact that
the continuously increasing financing need could be fulfilled only at rising real interest
rates. The lack of transparency in deficit and debt accounting can be interpreted as an
indirect inflationary effect. Since foreign borrowing was carried out through the central
bank, part of the costs related to public debt did not appear in the government’s books,
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which made the determination of the extent of fiscal adjustment crucial for stabilisation
difficult. The debt conversion between the budget and the National Bank of Hungary
at the end of 1996 contributed to an improvement in transparency by the fact that a
substantial part of the costs of external debt now directly appear in the budget. Finally
- before March 1995 - the delays in fiscal adjustment were coupled with growing trade
and current account deficits, which made the exchange rate correction and its
inflationary consequences unavoidable.
 In the run-up to joining the European Union, the requirements of sustainable growth
and disinflation cannot be met without a restrictive fiscal policy. One of the most
complex tasks of the future seems to be the definition of the deficit financing need
which corresponds to the above requirements. When determining the major indicators
of fiscal policy, it must be taken into account that in the short-run privatisation
revenues cannot help the financing of the deficit after 199829. These goals require
concentrated and co-ordinated efforts on part of the fiscal and monetary policies. The
shift in the structure of forint and foreign exchange denominated debt will depend on
developments in the short- and long-term components of the current account and the
capital inflow.
 The analysis of the last ten years’ deficit financing provides some lessons for further
fiscal adjustments. To continue the reduction of indebtedness, which - besides
sustainability considerations - is a requirement for joining the European Union, fiscal
adjustment must carry on. For the determination of the extent of the necessary
adjustment - the necessary primary surplus - the accrual basis and operational deficit
indicators are indispensable even if in the future the discrepancy between the indicators
of different approaches decreases as the inflation rate declines and the share of fixed
and indexed government securities in public debt increases.
 The structural analysis of the entire public sector (including the activity of the State
Privatisation and Holding Company) can serve as a basis for creating the harmony
between the budget deficit and the rate of disinflation. The following table summarises
the primary surpluses necessary for the maintenance of gross consolidated public debt
with different hypotheses about seigniorage and the growth rate of the economy30. The
sustainability simulations were based on the gross consolidated public debt, because -
as we already mentioned - the interest rate necessary for the simulations cannot be
interpreted dynamically for the net public debt.
 The extended consolidated - gross and net - public debt indicator calculated in our
study differs in several respects from the officially published figures, because both the
liabilities and claims were accounted entirely and in gross terms. This means that the
gross debt is larger than the official figures by the stock of domestic, interest-bearing
forint and foreign exchange liabilities at the National Bank of Hungary, but refinancing
credits were also taken into account among the claims of the central bank besides the
foreign exchange reserves. We did not consider, however, those “doubtful” claims of
                                               
 29 This does not mean that nothing is left (or ought ) to be privatized in the future, since the state still
has plenty of assets that are not necessary for performing its functions or that are not used efficiently
by the state. In case of these assets a protracted, less spectacular privatization process is likely to
follow whose principles are not known yet.
 30 Thus, we did not include the implicit public debt in this investigation, since we have no reliable
information on its magnitude.
45
the government which are not guaranteed to produce revenues, for instance claims
from the corporate and banking sector consolidations.
 Therefore, the extended consolidated gross public debt used in our calculations
includes:
· Foreign borrowing by the National Bank of Hungary
· Direct foreign borrowing of the budget
· Forint denominated government securities outside the central bank
· Domestic and foreign borrowing of the different fiscal subsystems (local
governments)
· Besides the above items which are also included in the official figures, our gross
public debt measure incorporates the interest-bearing domestic liabilities of the
central bank’s balance sheet: the stock of reverse repo, forint and foreign exchange
deposits, as well as the stock of sterilisation bonds issued by the NBH. Thus, the
extended consolidated (gross and net) public debt indicator defined this way -
unlike the usual consolidated public debt indicators - includes the central bank’s
short-term liabilities and claims bearing market interest rates. Hence, even though
our debt-to-GDP ratios differ from the official ones, they are invariant to
institutional division of debt, and they help identify future tendencies and determine
requirements for fiscal policy.
 
 Table 11. Sustainability Check
 (Required primary balance in order to sustain the gross debt/GDP ratio)
 
 Basic assumptions:
 
 Net public debt: 47.6% of GDP
 Gross liabilities: 75.8% of GDP
 Gross claims: 28.2% of GDP
 Real interest rate: 6 %
    Long-run growth rate (%)  
    2.0  2.5  3.0  3.5  4.0
   0.0  2.9  2.6  2.2  1.8  1.4
   0.5  2.4  2.1  1.7  1.3  0.9
  Seigniorage  1.0  1.9  1.6  1.2  0.8  0.4
  (% of GDP)  1.5  1.4  1.1  0.7  0.3  -0.1
 
 Of course, the budget receives revenues from the consolidated claims, and these have
to be treated in the model as well. We decided to assume that interest on claims is just
enough to maintain the claims-to-GDP ratio without using additional resources, that is
it is sufficient to consider the gross consolidated debt31. In the calculations we assumed
the real interest rate to be 6%, because even though the real interest rate was closer to
5% on gross liabilities, this was calculated based on CPI inflation, and the discrepancy
                                               
 31 This assumption is fairly close to the actual situation.
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between CPI inflation and the GDP deflator implies a difference of at least 1
percentage point.
 
 As Table 13 shows, the calculations were carried out under different assumptions
about long-run economic growth and net seigniorage32, but naturally we do not
consider these outcomes equally likely. For net seigniorage the smaller figure seems
more realistic, because:
 
· Over the last six years average net seigniorage amounted to 1% of GDP
· This value is 0,5-0,75% of GDP in developed countries.
· Financial innovation and as a consequence the reduction in the demand for cash are
likely to continue in the future.
· In order to improve the competitiveness of the Hungarian banking sector, the
required reserve ratio is likely to decline.
· The expected change in inflation is going to reduce the inflation tax.
 
 As far as the long-run growth rate of GDP is considered, the most likely value is
between 2.5-3% in our opinion. This figure might look too small at first sight, but we
have to draw attention to the following factors:
· If we think of really long-run growth, this value is not low at all, since, e.g., in
Western Europe this value was around 2-2.5 % in the past decades. Our estimation
was based on the results of empirical growth models, we substituted Hungarian
variables into the estimated models.
· Since Hungary’s population is forecasted to decrease further, the growth of per
capita GDP - which is a better measure of convergence - will be faster, and the
difference in the growth rates vis-a-vis the European Union is even greater, as the
average population of the EU is still rising.
· The high (per capita) GDP growth is not the only way of convergence.
Convergence can be achieved via equilibrium real appreciation as well, which seems
to be true for the Hungarian economy, and the magnitude of equilibrium real
appreciation is estimated at 2-2,5% annually. Summarising the last three points, the
per capita GDP growth calculated at purchasing power parity - which is the real
indicator of convergence - is rather fast, 5-6% annually even under the above
assumptions33.
· It is important to note that the long-run growth potential does not imply that the
Hungarian economy could not grow substantially faster in the short-run even for
                                               
 32 We did not consider the debt reducing effect of real appreciation, since this cannot be regarded as a
real long-term effect due to the described changes in the currency structure of debt, that is we can
assume the elimination of net consolidated foreign exchange debt even in the short-run, if the
economy continues to stay on the equilibrium path.
33 Considering the fact that the level of per capita GDP calculated at purchasing power parity is most
likely to be significantly underestimated, the catching up to the European Union will take 20 years in
the optimist scenario based on the figures presented.
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several years. However, even if the economy grows substantially faster than the
above rate in the next years - that is the debt-to-GDP ratio declines faster - this is
not an argument for deviating from the long-run cyclically neutral equilibrium. In
this situation fiscal expansion is not only unnecessary, but also dangerous from a
cyclical point of view, because it may jeopardise the disinflation process and the
macroeconomic equilibrium.
· Furthermore, for the determination of the primary surplus necessary for future
sustainable growth and convergence, one must consider that Hungary’s current
indebtedness is too high for its level of development. When the developed industrial
economies were at Hungary’s present development level, their debt-to-GDP ratio
was significantly lower than that of Hungary today34. Hence, in the case of Hungary
the debt sustainability constraint for the primary balance is substantially harder, the
possibility for deviation from the long-run, cyclically neutral equilibrium is less.
· The sizeable surplus of the primary balance and the low budget deficit are important
not only to avoid the increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio and to keep economic
growth on a sustainable path. The budget deficit has to be considered as part of
domestic savings , and since at an increasing level of domestic savings the economy
can grow on a higher equilibrium path, the rise in the primary surplus -
paradoxically - results in the medium-run in a higher economic growth rate.
 
 In summary, if Hungarian policymakers are serious about disinflation, and financial
innovation continues, net seigniorage is not expected to exceed 1% of GDP. If the
revenue arising from expected money creation is compared to the long-run economic
growth rate of approximately 3% estimated by the growth model, then it can be seen
that in order to sustain gross debt the cyclically neutral primary surplus has to reach
1.5-2% of GDP. A reduction in debt and disinflation together require an even higher
primary surplus close to the levels in 1996 and 1997.
 
                                               
34 In the 1960s, the average gross debt/GDP ratio of those small, open European economies for which
we could obtain data (Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden) was
on average 20.5%. If we disregard Belgium whose gross debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to 52.9%
already in this period, the average value is 15.1%.
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 Appendix: Budget deficit, public debt and monetisation
 
 1.1. Methodology
 The connection between inflation and fiscal stance can be investigated starting from the
well known budget constraint:
 (1) PBt + Dt-1*it = DHt + DFXt + DHUFt
 and Dt = FXt + HUFt,
· PB: primary balance,
· D: general government debt
· i: interest rate,
· H: monetary base
· FX: foreign currency denominated government debt,
· HUF: forint denominated government debt,
· D: change in stocks,
· t: variable in year t.
 
 The budget deficit can be financed by interest bearing debt (D) and by money creation
(H). The dynamic relationship between deficit and debt is calculated by rearranging
equation (1).
 
 D(Dt  / Yt ) = bt - st + (Dt-1  / Yt-1 ) *( rt-gt )/(1+gt )          (2)
 where:
· b: primary balance in percent of GDP
· s: seigniorage in percent of GDP
· r: real interest rate
· g: real GDP growth
 
 Equation (2) indicates that the debt/GDP ratio can be on an explosive path if real
interest rate (r) is higher than the real GDP growth (g) and this effect is not offset by
the surplus of the primary balance (b=PB/Y). Money financing (seigniorage, s=DH/Y)
reduces the debt/GDP ratio, however, is not sustanable in the medium run as it
increases inflation and deteriorates the current account. If a large proportion of the
debt is denominated in foreign currency, like in Hungary, then exchange rate
movements affect the debt/GDP ratio considerably. By rearranging equation (2) the
level of primary balance, which leaves the debt ratio unaffected can be determined.
Seigniorage decreases the required level of primary balance as shown in (3):
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 b = s - (D/Y)-1 * (r-g)/(1+g)          (negative b means primary surplus)
(3)
 It is worth emphasising that when investigating sustainability, debt/GDP ratio has to be
devided by (1+g) before multilied by the real interest rate real growth rate differential.
 
 1.2. Consolidation of the general government and the central bank
(deficit and debt consolidation)
 
 Deficit consolidation
 
 Equation (1) below is simply the budget constraint, which equates the above-the-line
total nominal deficit with below-the-line financing sources.  The nominal deficit is
equal to the primary deficit plus total net interest payments.  Interest paid on the
general government’s debt (including debt held by the central bank) increases the
budget deficit. Central bank transfer of profits (less operating expenses) to the
government reduces the deficit.  The deficit is financed by increasing domestic market
debt, by (net) borrowing from the central bank or by issuing foreign debt directly (the
latter was insignificant in Hungary during that period).
 
 (1) Dgg = PB +ibB + igCg +i*C*E + DE*C - Sc = DBd + DCgd +DC*E
 
· Dgg: general government budget deficit,
· PB: primary balance (excluding privatisation revenues),
· B: government’s net domestic debt outside the central bank (B = Bn + Bd)
·     -Bn: non-deficit financing domestic debt outside the central bank
·     -Bd: deficit financing domestic debt outside the central bank
· Cg: net liabilities at the central bank (C = Cgn + Cgd) ,
·     - Cgn : non-deficit financing debt at the central bank
·     - Cgd : deficit financing debt at the central bank
· C*: foreign debt of government in foreign currency terms
· Sc : central bank’s dividend paid to the government,
· i: domestic nominal interest rates,
· i*: foreign nominal interest rate
· E: nominal exchange rate
 
 The simplified balance sheet of the central bank (excluding non-financial
assets/liabilities which are not relevant in this context) can be written as follows:
 
 NFA*E + Cg + Cp = H + NW
 
· NFA*: net foreign assets of the central bank in foreign currency
· Cg :  net credits to the government
· Cp : net credits to the private sector
· NW : net worth of the central bank
· H: monetary base, the sum of cash and banks’ reserves (H = CU + R)
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 From this balance sheet, we can derive (2) which shows the quasi-fiscal deficit. It is
equal to the (negative) change in net worth of the central bank:
 
 (2) Dcb = -DNW = - i*NFA*E - DNFA*E - igCg - ipCp + irR + Sc = DH - DCg - DCp
-D(NFA*E)
 
 By combining (1) and (2), the nominal consolidated deficit can then be written:
 
 (3) Dc = Dgg + Dcb = PB + ibB - i*NFA*E - ipCp +i*C*E+ irR = DBd - DCgn - DCp -
D(NFA*E)+D(C*E) + DH
 
 The real consolidated public sector deficit, also called operational deficit, can be
obtained by dividing all terms in equation (3) by the price level P and decomposing the
real interest rate into various components to show the impact of inflation. This is
shown in (4) where lower case variables indicate real variables.
 
 (4) d = pb + rbb - rpcp+ (r*+e’)(c*-nfa*)e = (DH - rrR)/P - Dcp + Db + D(c*e-
nfa*e)
· r: real domestic interest rate
· r*: real foreign interest rate
· e: real exchange rate
· e’:real depreciation of exchange rate
 
 Debt consolidation
 
 The net debt of government consists of three parts: the domestic debt, the central
bank’s net claims on the government and the direct foreign debt:
 
 NGD =  B + Cg+C*E
 
 The change in net government debt results partly from the financing of the budget
deficit and partly from the accumulation of the non-deficit financing government debt,
while privatisation revenues reduce the debt burden, as shown by the identity below.
 
 DNGD = Dgb + DBn + DCgn + DEC* - PR
 
· PR: Privatisation revenues
 
 The bulk of the non-deficit related increase of the market debt are Treasuries issued for
the recapitalization of the banking sector.  Non-deficit related government liabilities at
the central bank basically reflects devaluation losses on foreign debt. There is also a
small amount of devaluation loss on the direct foreign credits of the government.
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 Privatisation revenues are recorded "below-the-line" and leave the budget deficit
unaffected, but reduce the non-deficit financing government debt.
 
 The monetary base is viewed as a source of seigniorage and not as a part of the public
debt, therefore the net consolidated public debt, NPD, must be written:
 
 NPD =  B + Bn +C*E - NFA*E - Cp = NGD - H - NW
 
 and the change in the net consolidated public debt equals the change in net government
debt minus gross seigniorage and change in central bank’s net worth.
 
 DNPD = DNGD - DH - DNW = Dc + DBn + DCgn - DH - PR
 
 This means that the net public debt is determined by the consolidated deficits, the
accumulation of non-deficit financing government debt, gross seigniorage and
privatisation revenues. Gross seigniorage (or monetary seigniorage) measures the
extent to which the consolidated government has recourse to money financing. Net
seigniorage is defined as the change in monetary base minus interest that the central
bank pays to commercial banks on mandatory reserves.  Seigniorage has two main
components: the net inflation tax and the real variation in the monetary base (the base
of the inflation tax).
 
 Operational (real) defict and its financing
 
 The operational or real deficit of the consolidated goverment can be calculated by
filtering out the impact of inflation. Theoretically inflation influences primary balance
as well, nevertheless in this paper only the inflation compensation part of the interest
payments has been subtracted. The impact of inflation can be subtracted form interest
payments in two ways using the budget constraint. The left hand side of equation (4)
comprises the so called above the line approach, where operational deficit consists of
primary balance and real interest payments. Approaching from the deficit side interest
payments have to be decreased by the impact of inflation on the debt of the previous
year-end.
 
 (4) do = pb + rbb - rpcp +(r*+e’) (c*-nfa*)e = (DH - rrR)/P - DcP + Db + D(c*e - nfa*e )
· do  operational deficit,
· rp and rb: domestic interest rates,
· r*: foreign interest rate,
· e: real exchange rate,
· e’:real depreciation,
· small letters (b, d, etc.) indicate real variables (nominal variables were deflated by
the domestic GDP deflator, while foreign variables by foreign prices P*).
Because of the unreliable deficit figures it is better to calculate the operational deficit
with the below the line approach using the right hand side of equation (4), since
changes in the stock of debt can be observed much more accurately. Real deficit
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calculating from the financing side composed of four items: (i) net seigniorage
(seigniorage minus interest paid on mandatory reserves), that is interest paid on
compulsory reserves of commercial banks is a negative finacing item and not included
in the deficit, (ii) credits given by the central bank to the private sector reduces net
debt, (iii) changes in domestic market debt and (iv) changes in foreign debt, both in
real terms. (This approach was applied in World Bank Papers on Hungary and Rocha
and Saldanha (1992)).
